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Abstract
There are many difficulties in teaching the law. These problems are often referred to generically as the difficulty
in training students to "think like lawyers." The primary focus of the literature discussing these concerns has,
therefore, been on how law schools should assist students in developing this ability. Underlying much of this
literature is the assumption that what is needed is some tinkering with the law school curriculum. Students are
believed to enter law with a set of abilities and potentialities that are honed by the law school curriculum to
produce something called a lawyer or the skill denominated as thinking like a lawyer. If this is not happening
then the curriculum needs to be adjusted. This article explores these difficulties and possible solutions.
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LAW TEACHERS AND THE 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 
MICHAEL JORDAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A PRACfITIONER'S EXPOSURE TO How STUDENTS THINK 
Since a basic premise of this Article is that we are a combination 
of what we experience and how we are trained to reflect upon those 
experiences, it seems appropriate to begin on a personal note. Seven 
years ago I left the practice of law to become a law school professor. 
By prevailing standards, the length of my time in practice made me a 
bit "long in the tooth."! Like most practicing lawyers who wish to 
enter the academy, I wanted to pursue abstract scholarly interests and 
be relieved of the burden of focusing on the narrow concerns of 
clients.2 
* Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 
1980; B.A., Bowdin College, 1975. 
1. A recent study of law school professors ascertained the average number of years of 
practice experience professors had prior to pursuing a career in teaching. See Robert J. 
Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile of the 
Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 191 (1991). There has been an increase in the 
number of years of practice experience a professor has before entering the academy. However, 
the amount of experience is not substantial. The average number of years of practice experience 
for professors included in the sample was 4.3 years. In addition, the tendency was for the 
number of years of practice to be lower in more prestigious law schools. See id. at 217-19. Thus, 
my eight and one-half years of practice placed me well over the average. 
2. Law schools are a "law professor's dream." See Norman Redlich, Clinical Education: 
Stranger in an Elitist Club, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201 (1981). "It enables the law professor to 
concentrate on broad issues free from the mundane lawyering problems which perhaps stimu-
lated the move from the law firm to the classroom. It enables the teacher to spend a great deal 
of time, if he or she wishes, on writing, consulting, serving on government commissions, testify-
ing before committees, and many other ego-building activities. To say that one is a lawyer and a 
professor, to get the benefits of both and to avoid the drudgeries of both, is a very attractive 
combination." Id. at 204. Moreover, a law school's prestige is partially dependent upon the 
degree to which its faculty vigorously pursues these benefits and avoids the drudgeries. Publish-
ing articles in prestigious law journals and serving on government commissions enhances the 
status of the law school, but does not necessarily add to the intellectual enrichment of the stu-
dents. See W. SCOTI VAN ALSTYNE JR. ET AL., THE GOALS AND MISSIONS OF LAW SCHOOLS 5-
11 (1990). 
41 
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However, I was not totally unaware of the challenges posed by 
the law school environment. I recalled my law school days-daze-
and how the Socratic dialogue seemed to be little more than lectures 
on what was in the casebook, interspersed with questions that sug-
gested the correct answer.3 There were also the courses in which one 
week into the semester the students were scurrying about in search of 
commercial outlines or nutshells because the professor was too theo-
retical and was not providing hard core doctrinal analysis. Hard core 
analysis denoted the extent to which the professor, at the end of the 
class period, would provide a summary of what the issues were and 
the specific rules or tests used to resolve the issues. 
Along the way I met others who abandoned practice in favor of 
teaching. They were very candid in disclosing the joys and sorrows of 
teaching. Part of the sorrow involved teaching students who had what 
was described as significant "writing and thinking problems." These 
disclosures suggested that there were a number of students who would 
have spent their time more productively by enrolling in a remedial 
writing and reading program, rather than attending law school. 
Finally, there was what was referred to as the end of the semester 
popularity contest known as "student evaluations." Some very good 
teachers were very popular \vith students and were granted tenure. 
Some very good teachers were very unpopular with students and were 
not granted tenure. 
These admonitions were a bit daunting, but not for the obvious 
reasons. It was not necessarily the ardor with which these opinions 
were expressed that gave me pause. What troubled me was how some 
of the comments resonated \vith the experiences I was having in prac-
tice with law students. These students were in their final year or 
semester of law school and were studying for the bar exam and/or 
seeking employment. Many of them were very anxious to gain court-
room experience. A routine, less glamorous assignment such as legal 
research, was not exactly what they thought their law school tuition 
had purchased. Though a problem, it was not an insuperable one. 
Most of them were willing to do this type of "grunt work" if they saw 
an experienced "real attorney" doing the same or similar types of 
3. Instead of being a partnership in learning where the students and teacher discuss 
problems to stimulate and enhance each other's intellectual growth, the Socratic method, as 
practiced, is largely a series of mini-lectures. New ideas are not generated by class discussion 
and class time is largely a recapitulation of the material in the casebook. See Gerald P. Lopez, 
Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic 
Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 312-13 (1989). 
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work. So, if an attorney with about three years of experience was still 
digging through the library stacks or a case file and not in litigation, 
they tended to think that perhaps this was actually a part of practicing 
law and there might even be some value in doing it.4 
Unfortunately, another obstacle frequently presented itself and 
this one was a bit more intractable. Students seemed to approach 
cases with a set of stock answers which they assumed would address 
most, if not all, issues presented in the case. This was a "cookie cut-
ter" approach to legal analysis. Essentially, the case was viewed as a 
lifeless mass ("dough") that could-should-be forced into previously 
acquired knowledge molds that imposed a limited set of forms on the 
case. The mold literally made the case. If the issues could not be 
forced into the mold then there was something wrong with the client, 
facts, law or whatever. Certainly it was not the mold. Knowledge of 
the molds and the ability to force the dough into the mold was viewed 
by the student as persuasive evidence that he was thinking like a 
lawyer. 
In working with these students the initial difficulty was in con-
vincing them that "the case" was more a concept than an object. 
What was present, among other things, was an assortment of actions, 
experiences, emotions and expectations collected in something called 
a case file. Depending upon the questions asked and how the student 
combined or recombined and interpreted the array, the case would 
4. It is ironic that law students should have a distorted view of what to expect in law 
practice. Unfortunately, this is not a unique phenomenon. There are at least two factors that 
help explain the problem. First, law schools are victims of student consumerism. Students 
demand a particular type or style of training which mayor may not develop the skills needed to 
meet the demands that await them as practicing professionals. See infra part III. Moreover, as 
consumers students are as vulnerable as any other group to inaccurate popular images of law 
practice. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS P ALA Y, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM ix-x (1991). The expectations of students are shaped by the 
same process that drives consumerism outside of education. The practice of law, like soft drinks, 
mouthwash and automobiles, will be all things to all people. Law practice is seen as a means for 
satisfying unlimited and insatiable desires. Little if any attention is directed to assessing the 
appropriateness of the desires, the cost to be paid for satisfying them, and the consequences of 
using the profession as the means to this particular end. Id. at 15-18. See generally STUART 
EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1976); MARc GERZON, A CHILDHOOD FOR EVERY 
CHILD: THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD (1973). 
A second factor contributing to students' distorted view of law practice is the law school 
prestige hierarchy. Prestige is accorded to law schools whose teachers focus on legal scholarship 
rather than preparing students for practice. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction 
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Alex M. John-
son, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and 
Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1991). As a result, students tend to graduate from law 
school with little or no exposure to or knowledge of practice. 
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also change. Their job was to hew out of that mass of material a form 
which was cognizable as a legal issue. 
A student's static view of the case also affected his legal research. 
Prior to initiating their research, students frequently presented me 
with a pressing question concerning the issue because "they wanted to 
be sure they got started in the right direction." This seemed like a fair 
request so the question was answered. However, this would be fol-
lowed, shortly thereafter, by yet another question to clarify exactly 
what was meant by the first answer. Then a follow-up question requir-
ing elaboration on the two previous answers, and on, and on, and on 
. . . . After a while it became clear that the operating premise of the 
student was that I really knew the "right answer" and the assignment 
was nothing more than a test to determine if he could find the answer 
in as few steps as possible. 
This process bore a striking resemblance to a popular television 
game show, "Wheel Of Fortune."s Like the contestant, the student 
could win the game by determining what the right answer was, with as 
little assistance or prompting as possible. Presumably the prize was 
recognition that he was "thinking like," or "acting like," a lawyer by 
quickly discovering the correct answer. This approach placed the stu-
dent in an alarmingly passive role. Rather than being actively 
engaged in the process of persistent independent questioning and 
reflection, he was more a passive receptacle waiting to be filled with a 
correct answer.6 These students were applying the Socratic method-
as it was actually practiced in law school-to their first significant 
exposure to practice. Questions merely set the stage for the delivery 
5. The rules of the game are fairly simple. Contestants are placed before a board contain-
ing blank spots that represent the words of a popular phrase. The contestants can see how many 
words are in the phrase and how many letters are in each word. Each contestant has the oppor-
tunity to guess at what the complete phrase is or letters that are in words of the phrase. For 
every letter that is correctly determined, the contestant can earn money from a money wheel. 
The winning contestant is the first one who determines the complete phrase. 
6. See PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 53 (1970). Thinking like a lawyer 
in this context would merely reflect the ability of a student to sit patiently, record correct 
answers fed to him by a knowledgeable teacher then repeat the answer in a slightly different 
context. As Freire noted, this is a static view of knowledge and reality. Instead of an active 
search for meaning and interpreting and re-interpreting experiences, thinking is reduced to 
recalling someone else's thoughts and feelings which are viewed as more significant than one's 
own. See id. at 53-54. See also Alice K. Dueker, Diversity and Learning: Imagining a Pedagogy 
of Difference, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 101 (1991-92) (not alI students think the same 
way and law schools fail to recognize that a student's development as a lawyer and legal thinking 
will be shaped by his identity, background and experiences). 
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of a stock answer by the interlocutor.7 On one occasion I abruptly 
terminated the questioning sequence by asserting that I neither knew 
the right question nor the right answer. The student did not believe 
me! 
And yes, the existence of writing difficulties among students was 
also confirmed. The primary problem was-well I am not exactly sure 
what the difficulty was, but there was indeed a problem. Perhaps it is 
best to simply list my observations. The writing was elliptical. From 
line to line, paragraph to paragraph and idea to idea, there was fre-
quently something missing which would have completed the line, par-
agraph or idea. It was as if the student assumed the reader could fill 
in the blanks and bridge the gaps left where sentences and ideas were 
not connected with sufficient logical and grammatical glue. 
Of course, filling in the blanks is possible if it were readily appar-
ent what the student was thinking or there was a consensus on what 
the conclusion ought to be. Neither of these circumstances existed; if 
they had, the assignment would have been a waste of time. It was 
equally clear that the problem was not caused by the students' failure 
to invest sufficient time in researching the topic and developing the 
written material through successive drafts. Effort was invested in the 
project. It appeared that they were having difficulty in logically con-
necting bits of information into coherent sentences and paragraphs 
that demonstrated an ordered, step by step, progression toward a rea-
soned conclusion. 
As an alternative, I asked some students to simply tell me what 
their research disclosed, that is, verbally analyze the material, step by 
step, to a conclusion. Perhaps they could do verbally what could not 
be accomplished on paper. Unfortunately this met with little success. 
Concepts would be placed in close proximity to each other but the 
student did not actually explain the logical connection between the 
ideas. In short, the students did not understandS the material. And, 
7. See supra note 3. 
8. The tenn understanding is commonly used to describe a wide variety of situations that 
can involve comprehension of material or simply the ability to memorize and repeat infonnation 
and instructions. As used in this Article, the tenn understanding denotes a set of specific skills 
and intellectual attributes. Understanding means "a sufficient grasp of concepts, principles, or 
skills so that one can bring them to bear on new problems and situations, deciding in which ways 
one's present competencies can suffice and in which ways one may require new skills or knowl-
edge." HOWARD GARDNER, THE UNSCHOOLED MIND: How CHILDREN THINK AND How 
SCHOOLS SHOULD TEACH 18 (1991) [hereinafter GARDNER, UNSCHOOLED MIND]. Moreover, 
"[a]n important symptom of an emerging understanding is the capacity to represent a problem in 
a number of different ways and to approach its solution from varied vantage points; a single, 
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here is where the "cookie cutter" approach to legal analysis resur-
faced. Concepts from the same substantive area of law were strung 
together seemingly based upon the assumption that they must be 
related because they were from the same or closely related substan-
tive area. Somewhere in the maze of concepts enumerated the correct 
answer must lie trapped within the knowledge molds created by 
stringing together similar sounding concepts. 
B. A FLEDGLING'S EXPOSURE TO How STUDENTS THINK 
Notwithstanding my experiences as a practitioner, I entered the 
academy. After all, at the time of these events I was a mere practicing 
attorney who happened to have worked with a handful of students. 
Certainly these were isolated occurrences. It is tempting at this point 
to baldly assert that these experiences were replicated in law school; 
the "cookie cutter" and the "Wheel Of Fortune" are flourishing in 
academe. Unfortunately, the problem looms larger than that of a law 
school or law student issue which can be analyzed in isolation from 
other social forces, and reduced to definitive questions and answers. 
Reducing the question to manageable size by calling it, for example, a 
law school curriculum problem, is perhaps tantamount to searching 
for a "scholarly cookie cutter" to limit a much larger and unwieldy 
problem. 
Yes, many of the difficulties just recounted are present in law 
schools. These problems are often referred to generically as the diffi-
culty in training students to "think like lawyers." The primary focus 
of the literature discussing these concerns has, therefore, been on how 
law schools should assist students in developing this ability.9 Underly-
ing much of this literature is the assumption that what is needed is 
rigid representation is unlikely to suffice." Id. In my example, the students were not demon· 
strating an understanding of the material because they lacked the ability to apply the "concepts" 
andlor "principles" they discovered to new unanticipated problems. See also lvIALCOLM 
KNowLES, THE ADULT LEARNER: A NEGLECI"ED SPECIES (1973) (describing how adult learning 
and understanding is focused on problem solving and developing skills and knowledge necessary 
to address issues unresolved by their current skills and knowledge); SHARAN B. MERRIAM & 
ROSEMARY S. CAFFARELLA, LEARNING IN ADULTHOOD: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE (1991) (sur-
vey of various theories concerning how adults learn both in and outside of formal educational 
settings). 
9. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADl\US. 
SIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter MAcCRATE REpORT]; HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHR. 
UCH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1972); ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING 
FOR THE PUBUC PROFESSION OF LAW (1921); ALFRED SMITH, COGNmVE STYLES IN LAW 
SCHOOLS (1979); Van Alstyne et aI., supra note 2; FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. 
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some tinkering with the law school curriculum. Students are believed 
to enter law with a set of abilities and potentialities that are honed by 
the law school curriculum to produce something called a lawyer or the 
skill denominated as thinking like a lawyer. If this is not happening 
then the curriculum needs to be adjusted. 
Some of the literature, however, attempts to formulate alterna-
tive views of what lawyers do, how they think and, therefore, the 
reforms law schools must institute to train students for this new vision 
of the practice of law.lO Unfortunately, what has been lost in most of 
these discussions is the recognition that law schools do not exist in an 
educational vacuum. Most entering law students have received at 
least sixteen years of schooling prior to entering law school. The rela-
tionship between what students are taught prior to law school and 
how this affects what law professors attempt to accomplish, is rarely if 
ever examined. 
With the publication of the Macerate Reportll law school curric-
ula are once again the subject of debate. However, the Report, with 
its emphasis on enumerating a check list of skills and values that stu-
dents ought to develop in law school, is not the first time this issue was 
seriously addressed. Lawyer competence, and the role of law schools 
in developing that competence, was previously scrutinized by the 
American Bar AssociationP Moreover, the Report shares with most 
of the literature in the area the same narrow perspective on law school 
students. There is little, if any, awareness of the possibility that an 
ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981); Anthony Chase, The Birth of the 
Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329 (1979); John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: 
Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDuc. 157 (1993); 
Anthony D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law School Teaching in the Age of Student Con-
sumerism, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 461 (1987); Edwards, supra note 4; Johnson, supra note 4; Philip 
C. Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REv. (1986); Charles R. 
McManis, The History of First Century American Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 
WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (1981). 
10. Dueker, supra note 6; John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship Or, If the 
Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343 (1989); A.J. Gold-
smith, An Unruly Conjunction? Social Thought and Legal Action in Clinical Legal Education, 43 
J. LEGAL EDuc. 415 (1993); Lopez, supra note 3; John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert 
and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty Considers the Implications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 275 (1989); John O. Mudd, Beyond Rationalism: Performance-Referenced Legal Educa-
tion, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 189 (1986); Redlich, supra note 2; Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers 
Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57 (1992). 
11. See MAcCRATE REpORT, supra note 9. 
12. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPE-
TENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979). 
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index of skills and values may be limited by the prior educational 
training of students. Law schools are now educating the post baby-
boom generation of lawyers. Attempting to reform law school curric-
ula without some reflection on what the post baby-boom primary, sec-
ondary and post-secondary educational system is doing is at best 
short-sighted. 
It is equally important to realize that law professors do more than 
teach students. Some of the obligations facing professors represent 
the fall-out from the drive to place law schools within the walls of 
universities. While this effort has been attributed to many factors13 
one thing is clear. Prestige inside the academy is frequently accorded 
on the basis of one's research, not one's teaching.14 Given this fact, a 
significant question which should be examined is: what are the conse-
quences of law schools finding a home in the modern research 
university? 
This question assumes additional significance given the view that 
law schools are training students for a profession which considers 
itself to be more than a means to enhance the private financial gain of 
its members. As Alfred Reed noted many years ago, lawyers are in a 
public profession. "They are part of the governing mechanism of the 
13. Jerold Auerbach, for example, argues that the legal profession and law schools should 
not be seen as institutions driven by the value free dictates of pure reason. They are institutions 
shaped by the ideological and political objectives of powerful groups in society. Thus, the drive 
to place law schools in universities served political and social objectives and was not mandated 
by any purely rational or pedagogical reason. See generally, JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEOUAL 
JUSTICE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976). William Johnson, how-
ever, does not see the development of legal education as being attributable to a single predomi-
nant factor such as political ideology. Placing legal education in universities was not the product 
of a systematic discussion of how to teach legal techniques, but was the result of piecemeal 
adjustments to changing academic and professional concerns. One of these concerns was a rec-
ognition by law professors that higher education in America was growing in prestige and law 
schools could share in this status by being associated with universities. See generally, WILLIAM 
R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY (1978) [hereinafter JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAW. 
YERS]. See also ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM TIlE 
1850s TO TIlE 1980s (1983); Chase, supra note 9. 
14. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 4 (professors at elite law schools are accorded prestige 
based upon the production of legal scholarship that is of little value to judges and the practicing 
bar); Elson, supra note 10 (the scholarly mission and model of law school ignores and limits the 
ability of law schools to train competent lawyers); VAN ALSTYNE ET AL., supra note 2 (a law 
school's image is based, in part, upon the scholarship of the faculty and not whether the curricu-
lum is structured to produce competent professionals). 
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state. Their function is in a broad sense political.,,15 Moreover, "pri-
vate individuals cannot secure justice without the aid of a special pro-
fessional order to represent and to advise them. "16 
Another factor which certainly contributes to the view that law-
yers are part of a public profession is the substantial overrepresenta-
tion of lawyers among elected and appointed officialsP This suggests 
another way in which lawyers are exercising a heightened level of 
influence over the public. On an ever escalating scale, issues formerly 
seen as moral or political are now denominated as legal. Lawyers are 
not simply "gatekeepers" in the sense that they provide access to jus-
tice. They are shaping the contours of social debate over issues that 
were previously considered outside of their domain and subject to res-
olution through private dialogue or other means of social control. 
Lawyers are defining the parameters of the debate rather than merely 
controlling access to and regulating formal means of dispute 
resolution. IS 
15. REED, supra note 9, at 3. 
16. [d. 
17. See ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 9, at 1 (In 1978, 69.6% of U.S. senators and 
52.2% of U.S. representatives gave their occupation as "lawyer."). 
18. This is not meant to suggest that lawyers are consciously attempting to influence public 
thinking on social issues. The process is more indirect. One example of this influence, and how 
it operates, is in the degree to which social problems are defined as a clash between absolute 
rights or entitlements possessed by individuals. Rights are defined in a narrow legal and abso-
lute sense. As a result, emphasis is placed upon resort to litigation rather than compromise and 
dialogue. In reality the conflict represents the need to make choices between equally valid ends 
or desires. The solution, therefore, lies in understanding, debate, and compromise, rather than 
insistence upon absolute privileges or rights. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS 
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) [hereinafter GLENDON, RIGHTS 
TALK); see also CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN 
CHARACTER (1992) (Americans see themselves as a society of victims who are entitled to certain 
privileges and rights as compensation for their victimization). However, even though many are 
quick to enumerate their rights, the possession of a right does not necessarily produce determi-
nant consequences. A right is an abstraction and has meaning only when it is exercised in a 
specific social context. Thus, in asserting a right, one cannot know in the abstract exactly what 
tiIe right is witiIout specifying the social/cultural context in which the right is exercised. A right 
is, therefore, another way of articulating a particular set of social prerogatives and duties 
grounded in a specific society. It is not, as commonly conceived, a statement of a transcendental 
principle or course of conduct which is appropriate under any and all circumstances and social 
settings. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1375 (1984). 
An example of the rights phenomenon in action, and how it plays a role in shaping the 
parameters of social debate, can be seen in the issue of the constitutionality of juvenile curfew 
ordinances. Courts are struggling with the issue of whether juveniles have a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest, tantamount to that of adults, which affords juveniles the right to be 
abroad at night. While the issue is defined as a question involving "juvenile rights," the legal 
analysis is not based upon transcendent legal principles. The analysis implicitly articulates then 
endorses a particular political and cultural consensus regarding the nature of the family and its 
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Thinking like a lawyer, given the changing demands made upon 
the legal profession, means more than the ability to analyze precedent 
and spot issues. It means addressing public concerns that mayor may 
not be subject to resolution in the legal system. Thinking in this con-
text is not necessarily a cognitive process governed by certain logical 
rules, as much as it is the ability to facilitate informed public discus-
sion of issues that illuminate competing values, interests and choices.19 
This vision of the public profession places it outside of the tradi-
tional definition of a profession which focused on mastery of special-
ized knowledge and providing limited services. Indeed, 
professionalism is normally associated with a reduction in the ability 
and desire to foster public debate and searching inquiry into issues of 
interests to the general public.20 The alternative expanded public 
view of the profession casts the lawyer in the role of public intellec-
tuaFl rather than professional. If this is what is meant when reference 
is now made to the public professional and if the reference necessarily 
implies certain ways of thinking, then we ought to ask whether this 
view of thinking and the profession is compatible with the setting in 
relationship with the state. However, when courts and advocates insist upon viewing the issue as 
one involving juvenile legal rights, the larger social question concerning changes occurring within 
families and society is not explicitly addressed and analyzed. See Michael Jordan, From the Con-
stitutionality of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances to a Children's Agenda for the I990s: Is jt Really a 
Simple Matter of Supporting Family Values and Recognizing Fundamental Rights? 5 ST. THOMAS 
L. REv. 389 (1993). 
19. See generally GLENDON, RIGms TALK, supra note 18, at chs. 1 & 7. 
20. See RUSSELL JACOBY, THE LAST INTELLECTUALS: AMERICAN CULTURE IN TIlE AOE OF 
ACADEME 147 (1987); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN 
AN AGE OF DrMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 385-90 (1979); GERZON, supra note 4, at 164-77. But 
see John E. Sexton, The Preconditions of Professionalism: Legal Education for the Twenty-First 
Century, 52 MONT. L. REv. 331 (1991) (lawyers have helped shape the nation's values and bear a 
special responsibility to act as society's conscience); Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, 
Rethinking "Professionalism", 41 EMORY L.J. 403 (1992) (law is the last remaining cultural phe-
nomenon that unites society and lawyers are, therefore, important in serving as gatekeepers to 
and protectors of this form of social cohesion) [hereinafter Terrell & Wildman, Rethinking 
"Professionalism "]. 
21. Public intellectuals are writers and thinkers who address a general and educated audi-
ence concerning social and cultural issues. Their goal is to stimulate an open and informed 
debate. JACOBY, supra note 20, at 5, 221. These intellectuals must be distinguished from aca-
demics who may very well stimulate debate over social issues, but the discussion is within aca-
demic circles. Moreover, the academic's mode of expression is highly technical and generally 
incomprehensible to the public. Rather than opening the debate up for broad participation, 
academics by virtue of their means of expression and audience, limit the participants to others in 
the academy. Id. at 1-8. See also CHARLES J. SYKES, PROFSCAM: PROFESSORS AND TIlE DEMISE 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988) (academics tend to use "profspeak:" a language that is incompre-
hensible to the general public and empowers academics by cloaking knowledge behind a veil of 
inflated and intimidating jargon). 
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which future lawyers are being trained. Are law schools structured to 
produce public professional/intellectuals? 
These questions go to the heart of what is, will or should be 
meant when law professors assert that they are training students to 
think like lawyers. Once again, the answers to these questions are 
going to be shaped by the type of educational experiences students 
have prior to entering law school. This Article will explore the unex-
amined connection between law schools and the world of education 
outside of the academy. Law schools will not be held up for examina-
tion in isolation from the entire educational system, but will be viewed 
as embedded in and profoundly influenced by the sixteen years of for-
mal education that most students receive before entering law school. 
The "Wheel of Fortune" approach to legal analysis has roots that sink 
deeper than law school, though the academy tends to look no further 
than the law school classroom or LSAT scores for an explanation. 
Finally, there is another outside pressure on law schools which 
will be explored in this Article. The ubiquitous demand for legal solu-
tions to social ills invariably leads to tension between law professors, 
law schools and the expectations of the public. The public may be 
demanding services which law schools simply cannot provide, or if 
they can, it may be at a price that law schools and professors are 
unwilling to pay. Another question which needs to be examined then 
is what are the public's expectations and how do they affect the pro-
fession, students and law schools? 
II. THE INTELLIGENT LAWYER PAST AND PRESENT 
To understand how law schools are influenced by the social envi-
ronment in which they exist, it is necessary to explain how the very 
mission of law schools-training students to think like lawyers-is a 
variable concept. A good place to start is by demonstrating that how 
an intelligent and skilled lawyer defines and solves problems may vary 
over time. Law schools are not set on a fixed course to inculcate com-
petencies and modes of thinking that remain constant. Once this is 
understood, law schools and their relationship to society will be seen 
as equally variable and subject to being influenced by social and edu-
cational forces existing outside of law schools. 
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A. THE GENERIC CONCEPT OF THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 
The phrase, "thinking like a lawyer," is assumed to have a fixed 
meaning because of the way most of us conceive of intelligence. Intel-
ligence is associated with the amount of knowledge acquired through 
using a particular kind of reasoning.22 There are, however, other 
more useful definitions of intelligence. A simple alternative would be 
the ability to solve problems and produce things that are valued in a 
particular cultural setting.23 This definition focuses on how intelli-
gence and what we call thinking like a lawyer, are relative terms. How 
lawyers thought about and defined problems in 1884 is different from 
22. This association is based upon a number of assumptions about the relations among 
mind, language, and the physical world. See MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE 
BODILY BASIS OF MEANING. IMAGINATION, AND REASON 21 (1987) [hereinafter JOHNSON, THE 
BODY]. It is assumed that objects can be and are represented by symbols. These symbols have 
meaning by virtue of their capacity to accurately represent things, properties, and relations 
existing objectively in the world, independently of the individual who uses the symbols. Reason-
ing is. therefore, the rule-governed manipulation of these symbols to represent the proper 
(objective) relation between symbols and the objects these symbols represent. Id. at 22-25. See 
also DAVID A. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE SOURCE OF LEARNINO 
AND DEVELOPMENT 99-100 (1984) (there has been a synthesis of the rationalist and empiricist 
traditions to produce the view that the mind possessed a priori equipment that enabled it to 
interpret experience, that is. equipment to locate forms in time and space and equipment to 
understand order and conformity). 
Thinking like a lawyer is believed to reflect the same kind of relationship between mind and 
language. When one thinks like a lawyer one is manipulating objective transcendent principles 
which are reflected in the law. This process is value free and does not serve any particular 
political or social objective. It is simply a process whereby the social world is organized and 
meaning is imposed on what would otherwise be an incomprehensible world. See AUERBACH, 
supra note 13, at 11. But see Steven Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between 
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, f!)J MICH. L. REv. 2225 (1989) (the construction of meaning 
is not rooted in abstract principles but develops through human interaction with the world and 
the culture that develops out of that interaction). 
23. See HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELU. 
GENCES 10 (1983) [hereinafter GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND]. "[H]uman intellectual competence 
must entail a set of skills of problem solving-enabling the individual to resolve genuine problems 
or difficulties that he or she encounters and, when appropriate, to create an effective product-
and must also entail the potential for finding or creating problems-thereby laying the ground-
work for the acquisition of new knowledge." Id. at 60-61. An intelligence or set of competencies 
resulting in problem solving and knowledge generation may, therefore, come in different forms. 
For example, a poet exhibits linguistic intelligence. This involves "[a] sensitivity to the meaning 
of words, whereby an individual appreciates subtle shades of difference .•.. " Id. at 77. It may 
also require "[a] sensitivity to the order among words-the capacity to follow rules of grammar, 
and, on carefully selected occasions, to violate them ... a sensitivity to the sounds, rhythms, 
inflections, and meters of words .... [a]nd a sensitivity to the different functions of language-its 
potential to excite, convince, stimulate, convey information, or simply to please." Id. Moreover, 
the existence of one intelligence does not rule out the possibility of other distinct and autono-
mous intelligences that combine in a mUltiplicity of ways in an individual or a culture. Id. at 8-9. 
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how this is done in 1994. Equally important, the societal acceptance 
of these definitions and solutions may also vary. 
Given this alternative definition of intelligence, it follows that the 
type of skills recognized as indicative of intelligent behavior will also 
vary according to the nature of the problem presented. Certain skills 
may be very useful in solving current socially significant problems, 
while during another period these same skills are deemed useless or 
indicative of ignorance. Thus, thinking like a lawyer may specify a 
range of skills and/or problem solving abilities that are limited tempo-
rally and culturally.24 
The world of the mid-nineteenth century circuit lawyer and judge 
described by William Johnson25 is interesting, not as a nostalgic look 
at days gone by, but because it suggests several things about what it 
meant to be a "good lawyer" and supports the idea that intelligence, 
or thinking like a lawyer, is a variable concept. Johnson suggests that 
lawyers were prized by their clients, and other lawyers, based upon 
their skill as orators, not their knowledge of legal precedent or ability 
24. This is the most difficult concept for lawyers and the lay public to accept. This is due, in 
part, to the way lawyers are trained. The case method was and is the primary pedagogical meth-
odology for training lawyers and at its inception represented the attempt by law schools to adopt 
the empirically and rationally driven inquiry undergirding the natural sciences. See Mudd, supra 
note 10, at 194. As a result, certain competencies which support this mode of inquiry, were 
emphasized in law school while others were de-emphasized. For example, the ability to array 
legal authorities into logical systems became a significant measure of a lawyer's competence and 
intellect. See Anthony Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 612, 613-614 (1984). However, the existence of one set of competencies associ-
ated with logical thinking does not preclude the existence of and necessity for other valuable 
skills. The case method tends to emphasize only one type of intelligence: logical-mathematical 
intelligence. See generally GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND, supra note 23, ch.7. Though in practice, 
highly skilled lawyers possess and exercise other intelligences. ("There is room in ... the legal 
profession for the individual who has outstanding linguistic skills: one who can excel in the writ-
ing of briefs, the phrasing of convincing arguments, the recall of facts from hundreds of cases ... 
and [t]here is room also for the individual with highly developed interpersonal skills: one who 
can speak eloquently in the courtroom, skillfully interview witnesses and prospective jurors, and 
display an engaging personality, the so-called society lawyer. Finally, there is room for the indi-
vidual with highly developed logical skills: one who is able to analyze a situation, to isolate its 
underlying factors, to follow a torturous chain of reasoning to its ultimate conclusion." ld. at 
317). 
The tenn thinking like a lawyer is, therefore, frequently used to denote a particular kind of 
intelligence, but it is better understood as a generic concept. It does not necessarily denote any 
pennanent and specific set of abilities. At any given time one intelligence or skill may be de-
emphasized, yet it is still included within the set of skills actually used by practiCing lawyers. The 
limited narrow definition of thinking like a lawyer appears to be more a function of the method 
used in training lawyers rather than the skills actually used by practicing lawyers. See Mudd, 
supra note 10, at 192-93. 
25. See JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS, supra note 13, at ch. 2. 
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to manipulate abstract legal concepts. For the nineteenth century 
jurist, being an intelligent lawyer meant placing oneself in a web of 
relationships involving the community, fellow lawyers and judges.26 
Today's jurists, who attempt to understand that period in the legal 
profession, are easily led astray in evaluating the skills and quality of 
the services delivered by practitioners. This misapprehension is 
caused by the relatively informal social organization of the circuit and 
the absence of explicit admission standards. Informality is equated 
with an absence of standards by which to control and assess the per-
formance of lawyers,27 What existed, however, was another means for 
formulating and imposing standards. Correct or skilled behavior was 
learned and exhibited through interlocking professional and social 
interaction, rather than adherence to rigid codified standards of 
performance.28 
During this period, other types of intelligence were valued, if not 
in lieu of, then certainly in addition to what we now associate with 
thinking like a lawyer. The interlocking social and professional 
associations combined with an emphasis upon oratory skills, suggest 
that a premium was placed upon linguistic and/or personal intelli-
gence.29 A skillful lawyer in this environment was not necessarily one 
armed with the ability to memorize and recite precedent or distinguish 
26. [d. at 28-29. 
27. [d. at 25-26. 
28. Terrell and Wildman refer to this type of organization as a club. 
The basic efficiency-enhancing feature that clubs can provide is predictability. In situa-
tions of great uncertainty-where social circumstances are in flux or the nature and 
quality of a product are not readily apparent-individuals with similar interests may 
organize to provide each other with consistent, comprehensible feedback, and to pro-
vide outsiders with a standard against which the members of the club might be assessed. 
The essential function of the group, consequently, is informational. Membership tells 
members something about each other-it helps them predict the kind of interaction 
they ... do not otherwise know well-and it likewise tells non-members something 
about those in the club. This information can sometimes predict a great deal about how 
the member will interact with others because the rules of the club are pervasive and 
fundamental to the member's life, like those of being a Buddhist monk. 
Thus, in order to serve this information function, club membership must mean some-
thing; but to mean something, clubs must in turn be able to exercise serious control 
over entry into the group and the behavior of their members. 
Terrell & Wildman, Rethinking Professionalism, supra note 20, at 409-10. 
Today the situation is reversed. The Bar no longer represents a relatively homogenous 
group of men from a similar background, interacting in close association and, therefore, moni-
toring and controlling each other's behavior. Standards of behavior are now often vague and 
subject to constant challenge based upon the diversity of experiences of those who comprise the 
Bar. See id. at 411-17. 
29. There are four major aspects to linguistic intelligence. First there is the mnemonic 
potential of language which helps one remember information. Second, language plays a central 
role in explaining other phenomena. Third, language can also be used to reflect on and under-
stand language itself. Finally, and most relevant here, is the rhetorical aspect of language. The 
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between highly developed legal principles. Instead, it was the ability 
to understand, based upon professional and social contact, how a 
judge viewed or felt about one's case and how these views were likely 
to influence a judge's ruling on legal issues. Or, perhaps the ability to 
anticipate what opposing counsel was likely to argue based upon one's 
knowledge of or ability to recognize the mood, motivation, or temper-
ament of counselor oneself.3D 
rhetorical is simply the ability to use language as the means to convince others to engage in a 
particular course of action. GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND, supra note 23, at 78. 
Personal intelligence has two components: intrapersonal and interpersonal. Intrapersonal 
intelligence involves the ability to access one's own feelings. It is the capacity to "instantly ... 
effect discriminations among these feelings and, eventually, to label them, to enmesh in symbolic 
codes, to draw upon them as means of understanding and guiding one's behavior." Id. at 239. 
Interpersonal intelligence involves the "ability to notice and make distinctions among other indi-
viduals and, in particular, among their moods, temperaments, motivations, and intentions." Id. 
"In an advanced form, interpersonal knowledge permits a skilled adult to read the intentions and 
desires-even when these have been hidden-of many other individuals and, potentially, to act 
upon this knowledge-for example, by influencing a group of disparate individuals to behave 
along desired lines." Id. 
30. These abilities mesh with the way members of the Bar were organized and controlled. 
Members provided information to each other and exercised control over one another through an 
informal social network. This network was an essential component of a process that shaped how 
a member viewed his life and place in society. See supra note 28. The absence of explicit codi-
fied standards does not indicate their nonexistence. Instead, it points to an emphasis upon the 
use of a different kind of intelligence in ascertaining the standard and understanding one's own 
feelings about and ability to follow the standard. This involves the use of intrapersonal intelli-
gence. Moreover, determining whether others felt bound by the standard and if bound how they 
would behave, involves an advanced form of interpersonal intelligence. See supra note 29. 
This is not to suggest that these skills or intelligences are nonexistent or irrelevant today. A 
skilled litigator today certainly demonstrates the ability to "read a witness or juror." This is 
clearly a form of interpersonal intelligence. The point is that this intelligence is a distinct compo-
nent of the generic concept we call thinking like a lawyer. It is possible that this component was 
more prevalent or valued at one point in time but has diminished in the degree to which it is 
viewed as the only or preeminent intelligence or skill denoted by the term thinking like a lawyer. 
Even though concepts change over time it appears that the phrase "thinking like a lawyer" is 
believed to have one constant meaning. This may simply be a reflection of how difficult it is to 
conceive of or remember how the phrase could have meant anything different. While the 
assumption of an eternally constant meaning for the phrase makes the legal profession more 
intelligible to us, this understanding is accomplished at the cost of alternative conceptions of how 
the profession might be or has been structured. See PffiUP R:iEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF TIlE THERA-
PEUTIC: THE USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD 232 (1966) (culture makes the world more intelligi-
ble to us by generating meanings and understandings that are implicitly understood and do not 
require reflection or conscious commitment to these meanings); cf. Robert W. Gordon, Critical 
Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 109 (1984) (the real power of the dominant tradition in 
legal thinking lies in its persuasive ability to convince people that the way it conceives of the 
world may not be the only view, but it delineates the only attainable world in which a sane 
person would want to live). 
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This was also a time when lawyers were trained by apprenticing.31 
The existence of this type of training is suggestive of a different view 
of what thinking like a lawyer meant and the type of skills a successful 
lawyer possessed. Different intelligences, and skills associated with 
them, are developed through different forms of training. Apprentice-
ships emphasize contextualized learning in which "the reasons for the 
various procedures being taught are generally evident, because the 
master is in the process of producing goods or services for which there 
exist an explicit demand and an evident use.,,32 In this environment, 
the knowledge transmitted and skills developed are intertwined with 
the interpersonal aspects of life within the culture. Learning occurs 
through establishing a personal bond with someone who is recognized 
and accorded respect within society.33 Teaching abstract concepts is 
rejected in favor of inculcating particular skills that are mastered 
through observation and repetition.34 
If the nineteenth century views of thinking like a lawyer, and how 
lawyers ought to be trained, are compared with the current conception 
of these ideas, some striking differences emerge. Today's lawyers are 
trained, almost exclusively, in law schools. The gradual movement 
from apprenticing to schooling corresponded ,vith a shift in what was 
emphasized in the new formulation of the concept, thinking like a law-
yer. Law school training and lawyerly thinking were defined as a form 
of scientific inquiry. Students learned, and professors were in search 
of, universal and abstract legal principles.35 
Formal schooling, whether it is primary education, graduate or 
professional school, is structured to meet the demands of learning 
abstract principles. Schools at every level in the educational system 
tend to emphasize decontextuaIized learning where the subject matter 
covered cannot be seen, touched or experienced. Students are trained 
to manipulate abstract concepts and symbols, rather than taught how 
to acquire particular skills and solve specific problems rooted in their 
experiences.36 Thus, "law schooling" is directly related to a changed 
conception of the law. Law students needed to be trained in compre-
hending and manipulating the principles generated by the new science 
of law. Students learned to think abstractly rather than contextually, 
31. See generally STEVENS, supra note 13. 
32. GARDNER, UNSCHOOLED MIND, supra note 8, at 122. 
33. GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND, supra note 23, at 343-44. 
34. Id. 
35. See Chase, supra note 9, at 331-43; Schultz, supra note 10, at 57-58. 
36. GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND, supra note 23, at 357-58. 
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and this learning process was severed from personal bonds which for-
merly supported the learning process in apprenticeships. 
This type of training and thinking engenders a hierarchical view 
of how knowledge is created and should be valued.37 At the pinnacle 
of the hierarchy is the researcher/theoretician. His primary concern is 
scientific investigation and theoretical systematization of knowledge. 
Inquiry into how this knowledge is applied to concrete problem situa-
tions is not his concern. This knowledge is literally generated in a 
domain distinct from practice and is now largely associated with law 
school professors teaching in universities.38 At the other end of the 
spectrum is the practitioner who indirectly relies upon the theoretical 
knowledge generated by professor/scientists to form the basis for 
resolving the problems of clients.39 Only certain forms of thought 
employed in the university setting are considered scientific. The 
search for abstract legal principles in cases was a scientific process, 
while what occurred in a practitioner's office was not.40 
For the mid-nineteenth century lawyer, this conception of law 
practice and legal knowledge was distinctly different from the world of 
apprenticing and legal practice. He was enmeshed in a web of profes-
sional and personal relationships in which legal problems and knowl-
edge tended to present themselves in concrete situations. Issues were 
discussed and refined not necessarily in a law library, but in watching, 
interacting with and learning from fellow practitioners in the context 
of life on the judicial circuit. One knew how to think because one 
learned the process by associating with others working their way 
through similar problems. Now, one learns how to think by mastering 
37. David Schon argues that this hierarchical view of knowledge is part of the model of 
technical rationality that has shaped ideas about the professions. This model views professional 
activity as "instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory to 
technique." DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECI1VE PRACTITIONER How PROFESSIONALS THrNK 
IN AcnON 21 (1983) [hereinafter SCHON, REFLECI1VE PRACTITIONER]. Professions operate on 
the assumption that there are agreed upon ends which the profession must pursue and a scien-
tific knowledge base which is used to achieve the previously specified ends. The knowledge base 
has four essential properties. "It is specialized, firmly bounded, scientific, and standardized." Id. 
at 23. It is in the process of applying the knowledge base to problem solving that the hierarchical 
view of knowledge is generated. Id. at 24. 
38. See id. at 24-27. See also Edwards, supra note 4, at 45-47 (too many law school scholars 
engage in impractical scholarship which fails to address issues faced by practitioners). 
39. See SCHON, REFLECI1VE PRACTITIONER, supra note 37, at 26-30. 
40. See McManis, supra note 9, at 644-48 (legal education in the nineteenth century was 
influenced by the general trend in higher education toward the adoption of a scientific model of 
research as the mission of centers of higher learning). 
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the ability to manipulate abstract concepts in an environment far 
removed from where the skills will eventually be exercised. 
Although it is impossible to resurrect a nineteenth century lawyer 
to verify how he thought, what skills he valued and how he learned 
them, we can still obtain a glimpse of the schism that divides current 
and past conceptions of how lawyers think. Oddly enough, that 
insight is provided by how current practitioners view the legal profes-
sion as being stratified according to the prestige associated with a 
practice specialty.41 Low prestige practice specialties frequently 
involve the use of interpersonal skills while high prestige specialties 
are associated with abstract analytical skills.42 Effective interpersonal 
skills roughly correspond with inter/intra-personal intelligence43 while 
analytical skills involve logical-mathematical intelligence.44 More-
over, the skills associated with a specialty also mark the boundary 
dividing schooling, with its decontextualized learning, from a contex-
tualized apprenticeship approach to learning. Practitioners believe 
analytical skills are an appropriate subject for law school instruction 
while interpersonal skills'must be learned outside of law schoo1.45 
The existence of a prestige hierarchy reflects the shift in the dom-
inant view of how lawyers think and the skills necessary to render 
41. See ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 9, at 92-93. 
42. The four skills seen as important by the largest number of practitioners were: fact gath-
ering, capacity to marshall facts and order them so that concepts can be applied, instilling others' 
confidence in you, and effective oral expression. [d. at 126-28. Zemans and Rosenblum note 
how these skills, while important to lawyers, are not peculiar to the practice of law. [d. It was 
not until the skills ranked fifth, sixth and seventh were reached that skills and knowledge, associ-
ated with the legal profession, were identified by practitioners as important. These skills are: 
ability to understand and interpret opinions, regulations and statutes; knowledge of substantive 
law; and legal research. [d. at 125-26. The most surprising finding was that the skills popularly 
associated with lawyers-brief and opinion writing-were rated quite low in importance. Only 
19.8% of the lawyers surveyed believed that brief writing was extremely important while 13.5% 
believed opinion writing to be extremely important. [d. at 126. 
The skills could be viewed as falling into two categories: analytical and interpersonal skills. 
Examples of analytical skills include: knowledge of substantive law; the ability to synthesize law; 
legal research; and the ability to understand and interpret opinions, regulations, and statutes. 
Interpersonal skills would include: getting along with other lawyers, instilling others' confidence 
in you, effective oral expression, and interviewing. [d. at 126-27. Practicing lawyers tended to 
select analytical skills as being crucial in higher prestige areas of practice, while interpersonal 
skills were frequently associated with low prestige practice specialties. [d. at 131-32. High pres-
tige practice specialties included: securities, tax, antitrust, patent, and banking. Low prestige 
specialties were: criminal, family, personal injury, and poverty. [d. at 93, note 4. 
43. See supra notes 29 and 42. 
44. See supra notes 24 and 42. 
45. The skills identified as being essentially analytical in nature were skills learned in law 
school. Interpersonal skills, however, were developed through practice experience. See ZEMANS 
& ROSENBLUM, supra note 9, at 135-38. 
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competent service. What were once assumed to be indispensable 
skills for a lawyer to possess are still present and considered part of 
the generic concept of lawyerly thinking, but they are accorded less 
prestige. In effect, these skills were moved to the periphery of impor-
tance. Skills which can be learned by individuals in other professions 
or outside of the formal schooling process exist and are used. How-
ever, they are devalued and do not occupy a prominent place in defin-
ing how a lawyer thinks and manifests this thought process by 
exercising specified skills in particular ways.46 
III. THE SCHOOLING CONTINUUM 
The previous section demonstrates that the term thinking like a 
lawyer masks many assumptions about what intelligence is and how 
intellect is developed. Intelligence is capable of alternative formula-
tions or shifts in meaning and the legal profession experienced such a 
change. This was, however, hidden from view by the continuous use 
of the phrase "thinking like a lawyer." Now that these assumptions 
have been exposed it is necessary to search for additional tacit 
assumptions that undergird the current view of what thinking like a 
lawyer means and requires. If as previously discussed, the term tends 
to obscure more than it illuminates, then an explicit examination of 
these assumptions will give us purchase on why students currently 
have difficulty thinking the way we now believe they ought to think. 
A. WHAT WE ASSUME ALL SCHOOLS ARE DOING 
Law schools operate on the premise that entering students have 
successfully passed through the schooling process and are ready to 
apply previously developed analytical abilities to the study of law. 
The transition ought to be smooth since students are presumably 
trained from an early age to develop the kind of logical/analytical 
thinking process employed in law school. This process "involves ana-
lyzing experience, reasoning reflectively, using formal logic, and 
assimilating, storing, and recalling information."47 Law school appli-
cants are, therefore, believed to have a highly developed ability to 
46. See supra note 42; Lopez, supra note 3, at 356 (acknowledging that lawyering requires 
practical know-how comes close to admitting that thinking like a lawyer is not discontinuous 
from everyday problem solving and similar to the work of other less-privileged professions). 
47. JANE M. HEALY, ENDANGERED MINDs: WKY CHILDREN DON'T THINK AND WHAT WE 
CAN Do ABOUT IT 247 (1990). 
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comprehend and experience the world abstractly and analytically, 
rather than primarily relying upon first hand experience. 
The very structure of the typical law school classroom under-
scores these assumptions. Law school classrooms are not terribly dis-
similar from classrooms in any other school. Learning occurs in an 
isolated environment and is directed by someone skilled in the subject 
matter. Tasks are defined and assigned by the expert/teacher who is 
more interested in developing particular skills and imparting knowl-
edge, than he is in assessing what may be of interest or concern to the 
student.48 
Law school professors frequently warn entering students that law 
school is unlike any of their previous educational experiences. 
Notwithstanding this admonition, law professors must assume that the 
law school learning experience is, in some essential respects, a replica 
of earlier stages in the schooling process. Students are believed to 
have been drilled in the process of viewing the world as consisting of 
objects with properties that stand in various relationships to each 
other, independent of human understanding and will. As a result, 
there is a rational structure to reality that exists independently of what 
one may think or feel.49 
Success in learning must, therefore, be measured by the degree to 
which one's view of the world accurately reflects the abstract logical 
relationships between objects and ideas.50 However, these higher 
level analytical abilities are "not automatically built into the brain."51 
They are a product of developing the ability to manipulate language in 
ways that reflect the abstract relationships between objects and logical 
categories.52 It is this learning process which is presumed to begin the 
first day of formal schooling. What is then new for the entering law 
student, is the learning of a new set of abstract relationships that exist 
48. See generally GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND, supra note 23, at 357-58; GARDNER, 
UNSCHOOLED MIND, supra note 8, at 131-32. See also Redlich, supra note 2, at 204 ("For [stu-
dents] law school has been more like college than either we or they care to admit. Although we 
tell students when they enter law school that they are going to be faced with a totally different 
experience. it is not that different. A first year law course still consists of a student with a profes-
sor at the head of a classroom. The student is still able to achieve success based upon his or her 
mastery of verbal skills and concepts."). 
49. This represents the objectivist view of the world that dominates Western philosophical 
traditions concerning the structure of the world and human comprehension of the world. See 
supra note 22. 
50. See JOHNSON, THE BODY, supra note 22, at 22-25. 
51. HEALY, supra note 47, at 106. 
52. Id. at 106. 
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in a specific substantive area of abstract inquiry-law. What should 
not be new and is believed to preexist entry into law school is: exten-
sive exposure to and practice in seeing the world abstractly; develop-
ing logical categories to represent this world; and using language to 
manipulate and explore this world of abstraction. 
Given the assumption that the necessary educational foundation 
was laid prior to law school, a critical question to ask is whether this 
assumption is justified. Are law professors mistaken in assuming that 
the "law schooling" process is a replica of earlier stages in the school-
ing continuum? If they are mistaken then students who progress 
through law school are not thinking like lawyers because they are not 
prepared to do so. Furthermore, if they are not prepared to do so, but 
are still graduating and practicing law, then the meaning of the term 
"thinking like a lawyer" may be changing-again. 
B. ALITERACY K THROUGH COLLEGE 
The evidence is mounting that legal education is built upon a 
foundation that is, if not crumbling, certainly weakened. Critical read-
ing and language skills, two essential skills necessary in the schooling 
process, are in danger of becoming a lost art. The problem is not one 
of illiteracy, but aliteracy. Students learn how to read but do not read 
to develop their abilities beyond minimum levels of competency.53 
Reading tests scores of students from primary to college level confirm 
this fact. There has been a consistent decline in the ability of students 
to read and comprehend the material read. Students, at all levels, 
appear to be less able to use the verbal reasoning and analytical skills 
necessary in comprehending abstract reading material and ideas.54 
Reading, and the ability to reflect on the material read, is a key 
ingredient that law schools assume students have mastered during the 
schooling process that sweeps them along from primary school to the 
law school classroom. What is actually happening is less than what is 
assumed. Certainly students literally learn how to read, but the kind 
of reading necessary to develop the ability to think abstractly-like a 
lawyer-is more than a mechanical process. 
Meaningful reading requires comprehension. This is the ability to 
understand the relationship between symbols (words) and the objects 
they represent and manipulate the symbols in ways that reflect the 
53. See id. at 22-23. 
54. See generally id. at ch. 1. 
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relationship between objects. We literally think through and experi-
ence the world through language. This level of comprehension and 
reading skill is inconsistent with the passive type of reading that fre-
quently exists at every level of schooling. Comprehension is simply 
not achieved by students coming to class and sitting still for extended 
periods of time waiting for meaning to spring forth from the text, fully 
developed, and implant itself into their minds. Instead, they must 
actively construct meaning by understanding how the symbols (words) 
can be used to represent, manipulate and recreate the world around 
them.55 
One sign of a de-emphasis upon the kind of reading necessary to 
develop abstract/analytical thinking, is the change in textbooks used in 
schools and colleges. Books are now more "readable," which 
amounts to nothing more than reducing the complexity of the ideas 
conveyed and sentence structure used to express the ideas.56 In this 
regard, one can see the schooling continuum running from primary 
school to law school, through the texts used in the classrooms. 
Anthony D'Amato notes how casebooks in law school have, over the 
years, become easier.57 Older casebooks were a collection of cases 
with little guidance as to how the cases relate to each other. Now, 
however, the casebooks include highly edited cases and notes 
designed to lead the students to a particular answer. In D'Amato's 
view, the old casebooks accurately reflected the kind of thinking law-
yers actually do. It is the lawyer that does the intellectual editing nec-
essary to harmonize the concepts, rules and facts in the cases.58 
D'Amato's insight is correct as far as it goes. The point missed 
though, is that this process began long before students entered law 
school. College texts and casebooks allow the student to be a passive 
recipient of information, rather than an active creator of meaning. To 
be sure, someone may understand the concepts and be able to engage 
55. See generally id. at ch. 13. 
56. Id. at 36-37. See generally LASCH, supra note 20, at 245 ("Under cover of enlightened 
ideologies, teachers (like parents) have followed the line of least resistance, hoping to pacify 
their students and to sweeten the time they have to spend in school by making the experience as 
painless as possible. Hoping to avoid confrontations, and quarrels, they leave students without 
guidance, meanwhile treating them as if they are incapable of serious exertion"). 
57. D'Amato, supra note 9, at 485. 
58. A practicing attorney will never find an edited group of cases that illustrates a precise 
rule of law. Id. at 485. Instead, "some cases will be on point and others off point, either confirm-
ing a rule or disconfirming it, distinguishing each other or failing to recognize contrary prece-
dent." Id. What the practicing attorney does is precisely what casebooks do for students. He 
must file and sort the cases according to their decisional rules, their facts, their procedural his-
tory, and what the parties are attempting to achieve. Id. 
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in the analytical reasoning so highly prized, but it is not the student. It 
is, however, the expert editor of the casebooks and college texts who 
is doing the intellectual "heavy lifting." The process of constructing 
meaning and developing analytical ability is reserved for the expert, 
not the student.59 
In this context, the "Socratic mini-Iecture"6o acquires new mean-
ing. Rather than being a process involving students and a teacher 
learning from and stimulating each other, it tends to be a series of 
lectures by the professor on material covered in the casebook. These 
lectures are combined with casebooks that already reduce or eliminate 
much of the intellectual editing that should be done by the students. 
What is left, is a scripted dialogue in which there are pauses for the 
student to provide the right answer to which they have been steered 
by both the lecture and the casebook.61 This reduces learning to 
information gathering, memorizing facts and testing the ability to 
repeat, in a slightly different context, what the student read the night 
or minutes before class. 
This process helps to explain the "Wheel of Fortune" approach to 
learning.62 The student's research task was not given along with 
assigned reading in a text complete with notes and questions. It was 
not "cases and materials" on a particular issue. It was simply "raw 
material" that required close insightful reading, reflection, analysis 
and editing. All of these skills were, if not completely missing from 
the student's previous educational experience, certainly de-empha-
sized to the point where unmediated exposure to "raw material" was a 
59. See generally HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF 
WORK IN THE TWENTIETII CENTURY (1974) (modem education facilitates the process of separat-
ing out of work intellectual activity that was formerly part of an integrated whole of conception 
and execution); GERZON, supra note 4 (most Americans are rendered powerless in controlling 
and understanding their lives because the technological revolution has tended to change what 
was formerly widely distributed knowledge, into small specialize units possessed and exercised 
by experts); LASCH, supra note 20, at 225 ("Modem society has achieved unprecedented rates of 
formal literacy, but at the same time it has produced new forms of illiteracy. People increasingly 
find themselves unable to use language with ease and precision, to ... make logical deductions, 
to understand any but the most rudimentary written texts. . .. The conversion of popular tradi-
tions of self reliance into esoteric knowledge administered by experts encourages a belief that 
ordinary competence in almost any field .•. lies beyond reach of the layman. Standards of 
teaching decline, the victims of poor teaching come to share the expert's low opinion of their 
capacities, and the teaching profession complains of unteachable students."). 
60. See supra note 3. 
61. See D' Amato, supra note 9, at 466-67 (in using the Socratic method the answer should 
not be implicit in, or deductively derivable from, the question. Instead the question should serve 
as the basis for the student to examine his way of thinking about a problem). 
62. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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source of consternation. So, the student resorted to what he knew 
best: relying upon someone to give clues. 
Moreover, the difficulty students experienced in presenting a 
coherent written statement of issues and their analysis was not pecu-
liar to my practice experience. One of the more salient trends 
observed by educators from kindergarten to college is the inability of 
students to comprehend logical relationships, make inferences, and 
draw conclusions. Difficulty in understanding text and expressing that 
understanding in writing is symptomatic of a deeper problem in link-
ing thoughts together meaningfully.63 My effort at addressing these 
writing difficulties by having students verbally explain what they could 
not delineate in writing simply missed the mark. 
C. THE MACCRATE REPORT 
Many of the observations concerning the deficiencies in students' 
analytical abilities are subject to the very criticism noted earlier: think-
ing like a lawyer has different meanings. Intelligence comes in many 
forms and perhaps what we are seeing in law school is a move away 
from the exclusive reliance upon abstract/analytical intelligence, in 
favor of other types of intelligence. One example would be intral 
inter-personal intelligence.64 Arguably, the MacCrate Report 
endorses this perspective when it asserts that law students ought to 
develop skills such as problem solving, communication, counseling, 
and negotiation65 which will enable them to recognize the desires and 
perspectives of their clients. Representing a client is seen as an ongo-
ing dialogue in which both the attorney and the client clarify their 
respective views of the problem and possible solutions. This view of 
lawyering is expansive and emphasizes abilities not traditionally asso-
ciated with abstract/analytical thinking.66 The Report, therefore, 
63. HEALY, supra note 47, at 227. 
64. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
65. MAcCRA'IE REpORT, supra note 9, at 138-39. 
66. The heart of the Report is an enumeration of skills and values which are essential for 
the practice of law. See MAcCRA'IE REPORT, supra note 9, at 138-41. However, a lawyer does 
not use these skills in an autonomous and authoritarian fashion that requires the client to pas-
sively accept solutions offered by an omniscient professional. See generally SCHON, REFLECI1VE 
PRACTITIONER, supra note 37, ch. 1. Instead, the Report is very specific in pointing out that a 
lawyer must understand how the client sees the problem and defines solutions. Problem solving 
skills are not merely the ability of a lawyer to define what he thinks the issues and solutions are. 
A lawyer must ascertain how the client defines the problem and the interpersonal framework in 
which the problem is set. Id. at 142. Moreover, effective communication with the client requires 
that a lawyer must be aware of the "views, situation, problems, and issues from the perspective 
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places a great deal of emphasis upon the need for more legal clinics 
and courses in lawyering skills.67 
Even though the skills developed in these courses and clinics are 
recognized as important, and may be manifestations of different types 
of intelligences, relatively few students take these courses. Most stu-
dents continue to spend a great deal of time in traditional nonskills 
courses.68 It should also be remembered that the Report did not 
abandon the commonly accepted association made between thinking 
like a lawyer and analytical thinking. This skill "reflects the prevailing 
conception of legal analysis as a means of reasoning from existing law 
and applying rules and principles established in prior judicial decisions 
(as well as other sources of law) to a new factual situation."69 Legal 
analysis remains an indispensable tool which students must develop. 
While the Report may endorse an enhanced view of legal educa-
tion and how a lawyer thinks, it still tacitly accepts many of the 
existing assumptions that surround legal education. For better or 
worse, law schools continue to focus primarily, though not exclusively, 
on one type of intelligence. Most of the courses currently taken and 
offered underscore this fact. Moreover, the Report assumes that stu-
dents arrive at law school with the skills and training necessary to 
function in this environment. 
This assumption can be seen when one examines the Report's 
identification of the key problems facing law schools and its proposed 
solutions. In addressing these issues, the Report does not give any 
meaningful consideration of the previous educational experiences of 
of the [client]." Id. 173. It also requires that a lawyer "anticipate the concerns, assumptions, 
expectations, and objectives of [a client] in a given situation .... " Id. 
These skills obviously involve the use of interpersonal intelligence. See supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. The lawyer and client must understand the strengths and weaknesses of 
each other's perspective. Equally as clear, is that the Report's advocacy for developing these 
skills is not based upon an original insight. Practicing lawyers have always recognized the need 
for these skills. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
67. See generally MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 9, at ch. 7. Given the Report's emphasis 
upon interpersonal skills it should come as no surprise that it also stresses the need for more 
legal clinics and skills courses. This type of training approximates the apprenticeship model with 
its emphasis on contextualized learning enmeshed in a social relationship with the master! 
teacher. The student is able to identify particular skills in specific settings and witness the direct 
relationship between using the skill and producing a socially and professionally desirable result. 
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
68. MAcCRATE REpORT, supra note 9, at 239-41. 
69. Id. at 156. The Report also noted a tendency to define skills instruction as involving 
skills other than legal analysis and research. However, appellate case analysis remains an essen-
tial skill which should not be de-emphasized. Id. at 234. 
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students and the affect this previous training may have on the 
Report's identification of problems and enumeration of solutions. 
The primary focus is on the inadequacy of current law school curric-
ula. Part of the proposed solution is to offer more training in law 
schools. In other words, the process of educating lawyers, the educa-
tional continuum, appears to begin in law school and extends prospec-
tively into practice?O The continuum does not extend backward into 
college, high school and primary school. Thus, the Report, even in 
emphasizing what could be viewed as alternative forms of intelli-
gences or thinking like a lawyer, ultimately assumes this intelligence 
suddenly appears in law school and students arrive at law school ade-
quately prepared to begin the training necessary to fully develop this 
intelligence. 
However, the Report is not totally silent on the issue of student 
training prior to law school. Unfortunately, when the issue is 
acknowledged, it is done so in a superficial manner. Whether a stu-
dent is prepared for law school through prior training is left to the 
student to decide. It is his responsibility to assess his fitness by mak-
ing "judgements regarding personal strengths, priorities, and other 
aptitudes.'>71 Students, however, can make that determination once 
they are fully informed of the requirements for the practice of law and 
the kind of preparation necessary to reach that goal. With this infor-
mation they will no longer be passive consumers of legal education.72 
As informed consumers they, presumably, will be able to assess 
the adequacy of their preparation and what they should expect-
demand-from law schools. At best this is an overly sanguine view of 
the power of consumerism to transform ill-trained law students into 
aggressive consumers capable of making intelligent assessments of the 
quality of their previous training. Students are passive consumers at 
every level of education from primary school through law school,73 
70. See id. at 3-8. 
71. Id. at 225. 
72. Id. at 127. A detailed definition of a passive consumer is not provided in the Report. 
Instead, the Report simply describes an attribute of a passive consumer of education. Passive 
consumers assume "that the law school experience adequately prepares them for practice." Id. 
at 228. 
73. The evidence strongly suggests that students are passive consumers throughout the edu-
cational process. Consumerism is more than simply students not knowing what to expect or 
demand from an educational institution or assuming that the educational process will prepare 
one for a particular occupation. See supra note 72. Consumerism in education de-emphasizes 
the development of students' critical thinking ability. Critical thinking becomes an activity 
engaged in by fewer and fewer students and educators. What students learn is how to negotiate 
their way through the system by passing tests that do not necessarily reflect anything other than 
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Providing information to student consumers, trained for intellectual 
passivity, does not create overnight an informed and aggressive stu-
dent consumer/learner. It does, however, relieve law schools of the 
responsibility of systematically examining the effects of student con-
sumerism on the ability of entering students to assess their fitness for 
law school study and their likelihood for succeeding in law school. In 
effect, the Macerate Report addresses the sixteen or so years of previ-
ous educational training that produces the problem of student con-
sumerism, by assuming that ,vith the right information, students, for 
the first time, can make the right choices. Even more disheartening is 
the failure of law schools and the Report to explicitly recognize the 
problem posed by inadequate training and student consumerism leads 
to law schools experiencing the effects of this phenomenon without 
fully understanding its source. 
When students enter law school as fully developed passive con-
sumers of education, they are predisposed to accept, in fact, demand 
the type of education that nurtures this predisposition. The demand is 
made for inculcating a comprehensive knowledge of various rules 
existing in narrow specialized areas. What is not demanded, and may 
even be met with hostility, is the effort to develop analytical skills. 
That is, developing the ability to analyze "difficult or complex opin-
ions and constructing arguments or interpretations that are relevant to 
the lawyer's primary task of resolving problematic issues."74 The lat-
ter approach focuses on developing the student's ability to master, not 
simply the legal language, but the mental categories and techniques 
that structure the language.75 Law schools are, therefore, placed in a 
position similar to colleges and even primary schools. Emphasis is not 
placed upon understanding and developing the intellectual discipline 
necessary to organizing and reorganizing patterns of thinking. 
the ability to take and pass the test. See generally supra note 59; GARDNER, UNSCHOOLED MIND 
supra note 8, at 186-89; HEALY, ENDANGERED MINos, supra note 47, at 26-36; SYKES, supra note 
21, at ch.5. Consumerism focuses on what students want as opposed to developing the ability to 
reflect upon the origin, nature of, and the need to be selective in pursuing these wants. The 
value of learning in this environment tends to be assessed according to how it makes the students 
feel. See D'Amato, supra note 9, at 462; Kissiam, supra note 9, at 276-77. 
74. Kissam, supra note 9, at 266. 
75. Chase, supra note 9, at 344. Chase argues that this view of legal training was copied 
from medical training with its emphasis upon clinical practice. Accurate description of clinical 
phenomena served a useful purpose in understanding the phenomena itself and teaching 
medicine. [d. 
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Instead, law schools augment the store of discrete bits of information 
that are not organized into useful problem solving patterns,?6 
Given the predisposition of students and the response of law 
schools, passive consumerism will prevail. If a student receives a col-
lege education which is touted as developing critical thinking skills, 
but does not, there is little reason for him to believe that he is not 
prepared for a law school, which also touts itself as requiring and hon-
ing analytical ability. When these students enroll in law school, the 
pressure builds for the curriculum to suit the kind of "thinking" and 
"learning" to which these students have become accustomed. The 
curriculum and teaching will tend to shrink to fit the student rather 
than encouraging students to grow to meet the intellectual demands 
engendered by the curriculum. 
This is not meant to suggest that the Macerate Report or law 
schools are responsible for the problem. It does, however, underscore 
the existence of unexamined assumptions which need to be addressed 
explicitly-at least as explicitly as the Macerate Report examines the 
issue of skills training in law school. It is assumed that law schools sit 
atop the learning pyramid, accepting students who have acquired 
basic skills in primary schools, which are later honed in specialized 
areas of knowledge in secondary and post secondary schools. The evi-
dence suggests otherwise. It is time to explicitly acknowledge that law 
schools occupy one spot on the educational continuum and are as 
influenced by what occurs in high school classrooms as they are by 
how Contracts I is taught. 
The Macerate Report is valuable in its focus on the need to cre-
ate programs that develop skills reflective of other forms of intelli-
gence that are necessary for the practice of law. Yet, the Report fails 
to appreciate the degree to which legal education is part of a larger 
educational continuum which is embedded in and influenced by the 
society which created these institutions. Thus, thinking like a lawyer 
will reflect, at any given time, how students are trained to think based 
upon what type of thought is considered socially useful. This process 
begins in kindergarten, not in law school. 
76. This approach to learning did not begin in law school. Educators are finding that stu· 
dents, during the earlier stages of their educational careers, are taught to memorize bits of infor· 
mation without receiving much training in how to organize and reorganize their patterns of 
thinking. Thus, learning is associated with the ability to recall bits of information in a particular 
order or sequence. However, why the order or sequence exists or how it could be altered is not 
emphasized. See HEALY, supra note 47, at 227-28, 247-49, 311-13. 
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D. ACCEPTING DIVERSITY IN THE BAR AS A SOLUTION 
It is possible to acknowledge that law professors are prisoners of 
their students' previous training and still argue that law schools can 
effectively operate in the presumed educationally autonomous world 
of the university campus. This is because not all lawyers are alike in 
their abilities, interests, and prior educational experiences. Alfred 
Reed recognized this point in rejecting the notion of a unitary Bar. In 
his view, law schools should acknowledge what actually exists. The 
bar is divided along functional lines based upon differences between 
clients served and the skills needed to render those services.77 What is 
needed is an acknowledgement that whatever may have been the 
strengths or weaknesses of lawyers in the past, high level analytical 
skills are presently in short supply in law schools. Given the current 
state of the educational system and its affect on law schools, a law 
school ought to recognize these facts and tailor its curriculum to meet 
this challenge, as well as the diversity that exists in the practicing bar. 
W. Scott Van Alstyne's critique of law schools78 could be read as 
offering a solution to these issues. He argues that law schools need to 
revamp their curricula to reflect the stratification that exists in the 
practicing bar. Many legal services are repetitive and require little 
legal analytical ability. It is suggested that law schools ought to recog-
nize this fact and train lawyers to render specific and limited services 
that will vary according to the level of intellectual complexity andlor 
skills employed.79 
Van Alstyne offers his proposal in response to the commonly held 
belief that there is a glut of lawyers. In his view, there is no surfeit, 
but there are too many lawyers trained to provide only a narrow range 
of services. The knowledge explosion and the growth of government 
regulation fueled the demand for legal services involving varying 
degrees of intellectual complexity and skill. Law schools ought to rec-
ognize this and institute curriculum reform aimed at training students 
to provide these services.80 While this critique is driven by a belief in 
an increasing demand for individuals trained in the law, it dovetails 
nicely with the prevailing trend in both legal and nonlegal education. 
77. See REED, supra note 9, at 414-20; see also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
7S. VAN ALSTYNE ET AL., supra note 2. 
79. See generally id. at pt. II. 
SO. Id. at 4S-61, 82-87. 
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The limited specialist exercising narrow technical skills81 is the 
natural extension of the student whose early education focused on 
acquiring basic skills and knowledge without developing the ability to 
integrate these skills and knowledge into a coherent understanding of 
a subject area.82 This student then graduates to legal education with 
its increasing emphasis on rule knowledge which places a premium on 
memorizing comprehensive lists of rules in specialized areas.83 After 
law school, the student is ready to enter a practice niche providing 
limited services to a narrow range of clients. Clearly, Van Alstyne did 
not offer his explication to illuminate the problems and consequences 
of changes in the educational system outside of law school. However, 
his analysis is still valuable because it provides, admittedly for differ-
ent reasons than those offered here, a view of how law schools and the 
legal profession will appear after they reconcile themselves with the 
previous educational training of students. Though he sees changes 
occurring in response to the increased demand for legal services 
rather than changes in the educational system, the effect is still the 
same: the creation of limited specialists. 
The critical question is not whether this is the direction in which 
legal education ought to go, rather it is whether there is any choice. 
Law schools are embedded in and influenced by the educational con-
tinuum and do not control its form or its direction. Whether one 
agrees with the premise upon which Van Alstyne's reforms are built or 
posits another, such as the need for more training in core skills and 
values, the fact is that students come to law school not fitting easily 
into the law school curriculum, with its abstract/analytical orientation. 
Law schools may be left with very little choice but to accept this fact 
and tailor their curricula accordingly. 
This is not a fatalistic view. It is, however, an open acknowledge-
ment that law schools simply do not stand outside of the society and 
culture that engender them. The irony here is that one of the major 
81. Van Alstyne envisions the limited specialist as possessing both limited technical skills 
and a limited knowledge base. Many of the services provided by these lawyers would be the 
same as, or analogous to, the types of services provided by non-lawyers in specialized businesses 
or service areas. Examples of these services would include real estate brokers, insurance agents, 
and tax consultants. In his view, the very existence of these non-lawyer professionals is evidence 
of the public's demand for these services. While these limited lawyer specialists may not receive 
training as extensive as other types of lawyers, they will still bring a level of competence and 
sophistication in analytical ability and knowledge that exceeds that of the trained non.lawyer 
specialist. Id. at 123-25. 
82. See supra note 8. 
83. See Kissam, supra note 9, at 263-66. 
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developments in law school has been the incorporation of theories 
from other disciplines into legal analysis. The law is no longer an 
island unto itself, but is influenced by other disciplines and institu-
tions.84 Notwithstanding this cross-disciplinary influence in the class-
room, law schools fail to explicitly acknowledge how much they are 
being shaped by other educational institutions. 
IV. THE PUBLIC PROFESSION VS. THE PUBLIC 
Are law schools simply the victims of the prior educational train-
ing of entering students? The quick and obvious answer is a resound-
ing yes. After all, law school is law school and law professors cannot 
be expected to provided the type of primary or post-secondary educa-
tion that other institutions are charged with providing. Law school 
professors are then the hapless victims of an educational system that 
lost its bearings. Professors strive to do the best they can with what 
they have. 
This simple response is appealing but shortsighted. A good mea-
sure of the power, prestige and independence accorded the legal pro-
fession is engendered by a perception that lawyers perform socially 
useful functions.85 If law schools are training, and the profession 
accepts, individuals unable or unwilling to perform socially valued 
functions, it is not too far fetched to envision a time when the power 
and independence of law schools and the profession are significantly 
diminished. Abetter, though less than altruistic, way of conceiving of 
law schools' and the profession's responsibility, is to realize that if law 
schools do nothing when the public is demanding something, the pub-
lic reaction may be negative and result in the loss of what is valued 
most: power, prestige, and independence. It is, therefore, necessary to 
84. See STEVENS, supra note 13, at 271-75. 
85. See SCHON, REFLECTIVE PRAcrrnONER, supra note 37, at 34 ("We conduct society'S 
principal business through professionals specially trained to carry out that business, whether it 
be making war and defending the nation, educating our children, diagnosing and curing disease, 
judging and punishing those who violate the law, settling disputes, managing industry and busi-
ness, designing and constructing buildings, helping those who for one reason or another are 
unable to fend for themselves."); John E. Sexton, The Preconditions 0/ Professionalism: Legal 
Education for the Twenty-First Century, 52 MONT. L. REV. 331 (1991) (lawyers have been respon-
sible for setting the Nation's values and uniting a diverse population, therefore as profeSSionals 
they must bear a special responsibility to act as society's conscience); Terrell & 'Vtldman, supra 
note 20, at 422-23 (law is the last remaining cultural phenomenon that unites the nation into a 
coherent community, thus the legal profession exists to protect and administer this vital form of 
social cohesion). 
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explore some of the public's expectations of the legal profession and 
ask if the profession can meet them. 
The public's expectations and the profession's response will be 
shaped by the confluence of the effects of the trends in education pre-
viously discussed. They include the failure of the educational system 
to develop certain skills in students and law schools being influenced 
by this fact, though not explicitly acknowledging and analyzing the 
consequences. Another factor which figures prominently in shaping 
the public's expectations is the redefinition of what is meant by the 
assertion that the legal profession is a public profession. This final 
section will explore what affects this interaction of factors may have 
upon both the definition of what a public profession is and how the 
profession will meet the responsibilities imposed by the definition. 
A. PUBLIC PROFESSIONALIPUBLIC INTELLEcruAL 
To understand the public's expectations of the profession, it is 
useful to recall what is meant when law is referred to as a public pro-
fession. It is public in two ways. First, lawyers occupy high positions 
in government and control access to the judicial system. Second, law-
yers play a pivotal role in facilitating the redefinition of cultural 
problems into legal issues.86 Now, recall how the present-day student 
consumer makes his way through the educational system to law 
school. There is the ever increasing emphasis upon acquiring discrete 
bits of information instead of developing analytical ability, obtaining 
answers rather than mastering the process by which answers are 
obtained, and compiling rules rather than understanding how to inte-
grate and apply rules to new unexpected situations. How does this 
process affect the public legal profession? 
The greatest effect is that at a time when the profession is 
expected to provide answers to our most pressing problems, it is 
becoming increasingly ill-equipped to do so. The kinds of questions 
posed to those trained in the law were formerly addressed by public 
intellectuals. These were writers and thinkers who addressed an edu-
cated public concerning socio/cultural issues of the day. They sought 
to generate an open, informed and critical discussion of social issues.87 
It will be difficult for lawyers to fill part of the vacuum left by the 
86. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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disappearance of public intellectuals and still consider themselves pro-
fessionals. Professionalization leads to a narrowing of perspective 
into a limited channel of interest and inquiry.88 When this is com-
bined with the tendency toward limited rule knowledge approaches to 
legal education,89 the result will be the inability of the profession to 
provide intellectual leadership on public issues. 
One cause of the inability of law schools and the profession to 
meet these expectations is found in the assumptions that support and 
justify the universities where most law schools now reside. Modem 
universities were founded upon positivism, which emphasizes the pur-
suit of scientific knowledge, not practical leaming.9o Law schools 
earned their place in the university community by equating legal stud-
ies and research with research in the natural sciences. Studying cases 
was as exacting, and spawned as much empirical and theoretical 
knowledge of the real world, as the work of any scientist in a 
laboratory.91 
The effects of this union between universities and law schools are 
still with us today, even if one does not believe in the original scien-
tific vision of the study of law. The ideology supporting the growth of 
universities includes a corollary to the positivist view. This corollary 
provided that even if pure theoretical knowledge is not being 
advanced there is a place, although a limited one, in the university for 
instrumental knowledge. Instrumental knowledge does not involve a 
search for higher order theoretical relationships. It does, however, 
involve an objective search for solutions to problems that are capable 
of resolution by discovery of correct empirically verifiable solutions. 
Scientific theory, when properly applied through specified techniques, 
could be used to resolve social problems. It is simply a matter of 
empirical testing to discover whether a particular means produced a 
particular end.92 Thus, there were two sides to the university. There 
was the search for abstract theoretical truths along with the search for 
solutions to specific problems. Both sides were subject to the same 
standardized and value neutral principles of disciplined scientific 
procedure. 
88. JACOBY, supra note 20, at 147. 
89. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; SCHON, REFLECTIVE PRACITTIONER, 
supra note 37, at 34-36. 
91. STEVENS, supra note 13, at 51-54. 
92. See SCHON, REFLECTIVE PRACITTIONER, supra note 37, at 21-22, 33-34. 
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Unfortunately, the issues which lawyers address in their capacity 
as surrogate public intellectuals are not ones subject to rigorous test-
ing and verification. Goals are often vaguely defined and frequently 
involve the nontechnical process of framing issues so as to clarify and 
choose from a multitude of ends and various means to achieve these 
ends.93 An indispensable component of any definition of what law-
yers do while they perform their public function will have to be an 
awareness of the extent to which the unscientific process of issue 
framing forms the core around which public issues are shaped and 
examined. This process is governed by all of the unpredictability and 
nuances found in politics, values and the life experiences of the indi-
vidual framing the issue.94 
The kind of education necessary to solve problems in this context 
is precisely the opposite of what is supported by the ideology of the 
university law school. Instead of focusing on rule knowledge, the 
starting point is realizing that lawyers, in their public capacity, will 
face complex and fluid social situations. Their analysis of a social 
problem will not necessarily result in fixed answers or conclusions. 
Analysis in this context is more analogous to insights which must be 
tested and revised based upon changing perceptions of what the pub-
lic desires and values or should desire and value.95 And, the informa-
tion acquired and conclusions reached during this process are subject 
to challenge and are not always empirically verifiable. 
Arguably, this amounts to nothing more than an assertion that 
lawyers must explicitly acknowledge that the increased reliance upon 
93. Id. at 38-45. 
94. See generally DONAlD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLEcnVE PRACTITIONER: 
TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS, ch. 1 (1988). An 
example of this process can be seen in the analysis of the constitutionality of juvenile curfew 
ordinances. The issues involved go beyond constitutional rights and focus on emotionally 
charged and value laden issues concerning the nature and structure of the modem family and the 
role of the state in regulating family relationships. See supra note 18. 
95. Donald Schon sees the practitioner's response to problem situations as being artistic in 
nature. That is, practitioners routinely face issues that cannot be resolved by relying upon tradi-
tional answers and problem solving methodologies. Practitioners exhibit an ability to spontane-
ously respond to problem situations by redefining means or ends that result in a reframing of the 
problem situation. Moreover, practitioners attempt to solve problems by immersing themselves 
in problem situations rather than distancing themselves from those situations. They seek both an 
understanding of the problem and the ability to change it by eliciting new information derived 
from their involvement. This attempt to immerse oneself in the problem rather than distance 
oneself in order to achieve a neutral rational perspective is at odds with traditional notions of 
rationality and scientific knowledge. However, it accurately reflects how practitioners approach 
problem situations which cannot be resolved by a rigid application of existing knowledge or 
methodology. See generally SCHON, REFLEcnvE PRACTITIONER supra note 37, at ch. 5. See also 
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the legal profession to address all forms of social problems means that 
members of the profession are moving in the direction of becoming 
general as opposed to specialized problem solvers. The power and 
prestige of the profession would not be anchored in the practitioner's 
ability to master specialized language grounded in abstract theory. 
Instead, lawyers in the new public profession would derive power 
from their ability to communicate with the public in a dialogue 
designed to reach a consensus on the definition of issues and solutions 
to them. 
It is doubtful that law schools could ever fully implement a course 
of study designed to train lawyers for this public function. There will 
inevitably develop a tension between university law schools and the 
demands made by a public looking for leadership and solutions in 
nonscientific, value and conflict laden areas. It may very well be that 
the prestige associated with being a member of the research oriented 
community of university scholars might have to be sacrificed in favor 
of a heightened sensitivity to the needs and demands of the public. In 
short, the expectations of the public may require that law schools and 
the profession undergo a demystification process which reduces the 
social distance between lawyers and others (both professional and 
nonprofessional) who are involved in the process of reflecting on and 
offering solutions to social problems.96 
Closely related to the problems created by university trained law-
yers is the difficulty that arises from the hierarchical division of knowl-
edge embedded in the relationship between universities and practicing 
professionals. At the pinnacle of the hierarchy is the university law 
professor pursuing a theoretical understanding and explanation of law 
without regard to how these principles mayor may not translate into 
practical application.97 Practitioners are at the lower end of the hier-
archy. They deliver services to clients by applying and manipulating 
practical rilles, derived from general theory.98 
Goldsmith, supra note 10. at 423-24 (the relationship between theory and practice is a "reflec-
tive, feedback model in which the predictive powers of particular examples of theoretical knOWl-
edge are tested against the experiences and commonsense knowledge of law students and their 
clients. "). 
96. See Lopez, supra note 3, at 356-57 (the more one champions the notion that lawyering 
involves a great deal of practical know-how and intellectual skills present in other problem solv-
ing professions, such as social work, the more one demystifies what lawyers actually do). 
97. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
98. Id. 
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Problems arise when the public imposes demands upon individu-
als in the hierarchy who are ill-equipped and not expected to respond 
to these demands because of the assumptions and values that are 
embedded in the hierarchical arrangement. For example, university 
law professors are not necessarily equipped nor expected to engage in 
the unscientific process of resolving social issues through issue fram-
ing. Conversely, practitioners involved in the day to day delivery of 
services to clients may lack the time and ability to address larger 
issues involving the use or extension of legal theory to new problem 
areas. 
President Clinton's withdrawal of Professor Lani Guinier's nomi-
nation as head of the Civil Rights Division of the Attorney General's 
Office99 is a prime example of the tension between the knowledge 
hierarchy and the demands on the legal profession and law schools. 
Professor Guinier expressed the view that she hoped "we are not wit-
nessing that dawning of a new intellectual orthodoxy in which 
thoughtful people can no longer debate provocative ideas without 
denying the country their talents as public servants."lOO It is signifi-
cant that the controversy developed out of Professor Guinier's writ-
ings which appeared in scholarly legal periodicals, not in literature 
widely read by the general public. In fact, President Clinton, a lawyer 
and friend of Guinier's, never read her articles prior to considering 
her nomination.10l As Mary Ann Glendon pointed out, scholarly 
journals tend to eschew practical aspects of law in favor of "a zany 
passion for novelty."lo2 These journals do not exist for, nor were they 
ever intended for, public consumption. They are a private channel of 
99. On April 29, 1993 President Clinton nominated Professor Guinier to be Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's civil rights division. Professor Guinier, 
during her tenure as a practicing civil rights lawyer, sued President Clinton while he was gover-
nor of Arkansas. This fact apparently favorably impressed the President. It was her experience 
as a full-time practicing civil rights attorney that lead to the President's decision to nominate her. 
However, after the nomination, the President came under increasing pressure from conservative 
senators to withdraw her nomination based upon their perception that her scholarly writings 
advocated an extreme approach to resolving issues over voting rights. On June 3,1993 President 
Clinton withdrew her nomination based upon his belief that Professor Guinier's scholarly writ-
ings expressed views on civil rights that he did not support. See R.W. Apple Jr., President 
Blames Himself for Furor Over Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1993, at 1, 8. 
100. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Tries To Cut Losses After Abandoning A Choice, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 5, 1993, at 1, 8. 
101. R.W. Apple, President Blames Himself For Furor Over Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 
1993, at 8. 
102. Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong with the Elite Law Schools, WALL ST. J., June 8, 
1993, at Op. Ed. [hereinafter Glendon, What's Wrong]. 
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communication between academics who use their own arcane 
language.103 
Professor's Guinier's problem was that, when her writings came 
to the attention of politicians and the general public, there was no one 
who translated her writings into a language that was accessible to the 
public. Serving the public requires communication through a shared 
language derived from open discussion with the public outside the 
walls of academe. This is generally not present because it is not 
demanded of the university law professor engaged in the business of 
"doing science." This is not to suggest that Professor Guinier's or any 
other professor's writings are never subject to critical debate and 
review, or that the writings should undergo a critical review process 
accessible to the general public. The point is that if the legal profes-
sion and law schools are expected by the public to fu1fi11 certain roles 
in addre~sing public issues, the knowledge hierarchy will come under 
increasing attack; perhaps for the wrong reasons, but this will not 
lessen the ferocity of the onslaught. 
If law school professors andlor law schools are to playa role in 
serving the public there will have to be a greater level of respect in 
academe for solutions to problems derived from debate, bargaining 
and politics, rather than abstract theory.104 Absent this kind of pro-
cess, the country will not be denied, to paraphrase Professor Guinier, 
the services of thoughtful people. Rather, these thoughtful people 
will simply continue to remain cloistered until they develop the means 
and desire to participate in the larger social debate that defines the 
issues facing the public and its servants. 
B. THE PRAcrmoNER AS THOUGHTFUL LEADER 
It certainly can be argued that Professor Guinier's experiences 
should not be read too broadly. She represents one end of the knowl-
edge hierarchy, but there is another end. Practitioners may be in a 
better position than law professors to meet the demands of a public 
profession. Unfortunately, there is growing evidence that practition-
ers may not fare any better in meeting the public's expectations. 
103. See JACOBY, supra note 20, at 7-8; Sykes, supra note 21, at 115-22. 
104. See Glendon, What's Wrong, supra note 102. 
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There is indeed an increased demand for legal services 105 but this 
does not necessarily reflect a heightened level of involvement by prac-
titioners in addressing social issues. The demand for services reflects 
the degree to which society is no longer seen as being held together by 
shared values and common institutions. We now tend to see ourselves 
as an aggregate of individuals, brought into relation with each other 
through a system of absolute rights possessed and exercised free from 
the interference of others.l06 
This ideology creates a double pressure on lawyers. First, they 
are asked to provide leadership in resolving issues which traditionally 
were thought of as moral and cultural dilemmas, rather than legal 
issues.l07 Second, when these issues are cast as a clash between 
rights,108 lawyers are then called upon to provide access to the 
machinery of justice which increases the level of divisiveness in society 
by focusing on resolving discrete disputes instead of addressing under-
lying societal forces generating the dispute. Reliance upon the legal 
system, with its rights based orientation, tends to deflect attention 
away from other forms of nonlegal inquiry and solutions. Thus, prac-
titioners in doing what is most commonly associated with them-pro-
viding access to the machinery of justice-are placed in the untenable 
position of being forced to give the public what it demands, but cannot 
live with, once it sees the results. 
The effects of this pressure can be seen in law schools with their 
emphasis on, and the student demand for, rule knowledge. Rule 
knowledge de-emphasizes issues of uncertainty in decision making 
and value conflict, in favor of providing students with a catalogue of 
rules in specialized areas of practice.l09 This should not be read as 
singling out law schools as the cause for the current emphasis on 
rights. Rather, law schools must be viewed in the social context in 
which they operate and the current emphasis on rights as the nostrum 
for social ills will inevitably affect them. However, it would be a mis-
take to simply posit a direct cause and effect relationship between the 
emphasis upon rights and law school curricula which emphasize rule 
105. The number of J.D. enrollments during 1965-66 was 56,510. By 1991-92 that figure rose 
to 129,580. Over roughly that same period, the practice of law grew as a service activity esti-
mated at $4.2 billion-a-year to an estimated $91 billion. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 9, 
at 13-18. 
106. See generally supra note 18; GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 18, at 14-15. 
107. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
108. lei.; see GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 18, at 101-04. 
109. See supra notes 30-32. 
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knowledge. There is a deeper current running under the demand for 
rights and the relationship between the effect of this demand on the 
legal profession and educational system. 
An educational system that emphasizes the mechanical ability to 
read words, as opposed to developing a deeper appreciation and com-
prehension of the meaning of a story, produces students who lack a 
deep sense of cultural meanings and values.110 This then produces the 
college student who certainly can read, but may not have fully devel-
oped the ability to probe the meaning of a complicated piece of litera-
ture or political writing. Then, there is the law student. Having gone 
through this process he grows accustomed to it and demands training 
consistent with past educational experiences. These experiences 
increasingly tend to constrain his ability to understand mateJ,"ial 
presented in the classroom as well as the world around him. 
The current rights explosion, and the role that lawyers play in 
facilitating it as a public profession, acquires new meaning when 
viewed against this backdrop. An insistence on absolute rights begins 
where deliberation, reason and understanding ends.111 A demand for 
absolute rights and leadership from the legal profession in achieving 
this end is a bit like a demand for absolute or correct answers and 
meaning from literature. You certainly can believe they exist and find 
them, but you lose much more in the process of the search. It is the 
internal dialogue between the reader and writer, the sharing and 
110. See HEALY, supra note 47, at 247-49. 
111. The insistence upon absolute and simple answers to complex problems can be seen in 
many contexts. In the legal sphere it tends to degenerate into absolute formulations of rights. 
That is, everyone has a right to do virtually anything he wants. Such desires are patently incon-
sistent with any notion of a ordered and vital, as opposed to self destructive, society. See GLEN-
DON, RIGl-ITS TALK, supra note 18, at 44-45. The insistence upon what one wants at any given 
moment is caused, in part, by an erosion in the ability to use language as a means for exercising 
self control. Language and the ability to comprehend the meanings expressed through words is a 
means by which behavior is controlled and reflected upon. At its simplest level it enables us to 
generalize from a present desire and reflect on the ramifications of that desire and how it mayor 
may not be consistent with other desires and the interests of others. This ability is what Dr. 
Healy refers to as "inner speech." See HEALY, supra note 47, at 177-90. Dr. Healy focuses her 
attention on how children appear less able to develop and use inner speech and, therefore, 
appear less able to control and reflect upon their behavior. However, one cannot avoid noticing 
the parallel between the weakening of inner speech which controls individual behavior and the 
absence of meaningful public discourse which might have the same effect on limiting the 
demands made on the law. Both appear to be rooted in the diminution of the ability to develop 
and use language that expresses meanings beyond immediate desires. See also WENDY 
KAMINER, I'M DYSFUNcnONAL, YOU'RE DYSFUNcnONAL: THE RECOVERY MOVEMENT AND 
01HER SELF-HELP FASIDONS (1992) (self-help movement reflects a general cultural trend 
towards assessing political issues by how they make one feel, which de-emphasizes issues of self-
control and responsibility for one's actions). 
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explication of meaning that is just as, if not more, important than the 
answer. As with the skill of meaningful reading, the debate over 
pressing social issues sometimes requires quiet places for reflection 
and informed discussion. The reduced concern for developing and 
nurturing this skill in students is part and parcel of a cultural climate 
that places a premium on correct answers rather than the slow disci-
plined process of inquiry, reflection and restraint. 
v. CONCLUSION 
It seems fitting to end where I began: personal experience. As 
with every other person who finds himself at a social gathering with 
strangers, I have been asked: what do you do? What you do is what 
you are! When I first entered teaching my response was that "I'm a 
teacher." However, I now say I am a law professor. The "I'm a 
teacher" response, in most instances, lead the questioner to assume 
that I was a grade school teacher. When I explained that I taught in 
law school there was generally the response of "OH! is that right?" 
The rising tone of voice while the words were uttered clearly indicated 
I was being accorded additional status because I was not a teacher, I 
was a law professor. 
It is not simply law schools that fail to see themselves as part of 
the educational continuum, but the public as well. It is unfortunate 
that what I do in the classroom continues to be perceived as somehow 
different and/or independent of what other teachers do in schools 
across the country. However, attempting to develop a student's abil-
ity to engage in a slow, careful and reflective reading of a case is an 
endeavor that binds law professors to other "teachers" far removed 
from the university environment. The habits of mind and conduct that 
facilitate this process do not begin in law school. Moreover, the stu-
dent who leaves law school to practice will not suddenly develop these 
abilities unless exposed to them early on in his educational career. 
More likely than not, there will be other reports such as the Mac-
Crate Report. However, any report or demand for curriculum reform 
that fails to explicitly acknowledge and accommodate deficiencies in 
our educational system is bound to serve as merely the foundation for 
yet another report pointing to yet another problem discovered in law 
schools and the profession. Until law schools take a candid look at 
the entire educational continuum and realize there is only one contin-
uum that places students in Contracts I on the first day of class, there 
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will continue to be considerable hand wringing but few viable 
solutions. 
This assessment will not be an easy process. It may require that 
law professors and administrators confess to admitting and retaining 
students whom they believe do not, perhaps cannot, "think like law-
yers." Admittedly this level of candor may be tantamount to sui-
cide-if a law school is not training students to think like lawyers then 
why should it even exist? However, there is no compelling reason 
why the current level of skepticism about whether and what students 
are learning in grade school and high school, should not also be 
unleashed on law schools. 
So, after seven years of being a law professor, it is clear that I am 
simply a "law teacher." I am part of an educational continuum that 
extends far beyond the front door of the law school building. That 
continuum not only affects what I and other teachers do, but also the 
demands that will be made upon students after they leave the 
classroom. 
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